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Abstract
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Policy Research Working Paper 5492
This paper studies the growth effects of externalities 
associated with intergenerational health transmission, 
health persistence, and women’s occupational 
constraints—with particular emphasis on the role of 
access to infrastructure. The first part provides a review of 
the evidence on these issues. The second and third parts 
present an overlapping generations model of endogenous 
This paper—a product of the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network—is part of a larger effort in the 
Anchor to implement the Gender Action Plan. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.
worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at ocanuto@worldbank.org.  
growth that captures these interactions, and characterize 
its properties. The model is then used to perform several 
gender-based or gender-related experiments—a reduction 
in the cost of child rearing, improved wage equality in the 
market place, and better access to infrastructure. The last 
part draws together the implications of the analysis for 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The role of women in promoting growth and development continues to occupy center 
stage in policy debates. As documented in a number of studies, gender inequality (in terms of 
access to education, health, formal sector employment, and income) remains a significant 
constraint to growth in many countries.
1 On the one hand, the gender gap in educational 
attainment has gradually narrowed or moved in favor of women in some regions; and in many 
individual countries the gender gap in primary school enrollment has almost disappeared. 
According to the United Nations (2010) for instance, in 2007 over 95 girls for every 100 boys 
of primary school age were in school in developing countries, compared with 91 in 1999.
  In a 
study of four decades of birth cohorts covering the period 1940-80 for Latin America and 
Caribbean, Duryea et al. (2007) found that the gender gap in educational attainment has 
moved in favor of females at an average pace of 0.27 years of schooling per decade.  On the 
other hand, however, 54 percent of girls in Sub-Saharan Africa still do not complete even a 
primary school education (Herz and Sperling (2004), UNICEF (2005)).  In addition, progress 
towards gender equality in secondary schooling has been slower, and in some regions, gaps 
are widening. In Sub-Saharan Africa, the percentage of enrollment of girls compared with 
boys in secondary education fell from 82 percent in 1999 to 79 percent in 2007 (United 
Nations (2010)). Only 53 of the 171 countries with available data had achieved gender parity 
in both primary and secondary education during that period. At this rate, achieving the 
Millennium Development Goal of complete parity by 2015 appears to be out of reach for 
many countries (see World Bank (2010)). 
 
Related in part to gender bias in education, in today's low- and middle-income 
countries the labor force participation rate for women is only 57 percent, compared to 85 
percent for men (International Labour Office (2010)). In most regions female employment is 
concentrated in either services or agriculture, with fewer women than men employed in 
industry. Gender inequality in health remains large as well; maternal mortality rates in many 
developing countries have only declined marginally (United Nations (2010)). Combined with 
gender bias in the work place, the consequence is large pay differentials. According to data 
compiled by UNIFEM (2008), the gender pay gap ranges from 3 percent to 51 percent, with a 
global average of 17 percent. Seven out of ten of the world's poor are women or girls, so a 
focus on poverty reduction involves necessarily addressing their plight. 
 
This paper focuses on two aspects of the debate on the role of women in growth and 
development: the role of inter- and intra-generational health externalities (namely, how 
mothers affect their children’s health, and how health in childhood affects health in 
adulthood) and constraints on women’s time allocation—particularly lack of access to 
infrastructure—and how, in turn, policy-induced changes in such allocation affect growth.
2 In 
line with the above evidence, much research on gender and growth in developing countries 
                                                 
1See Blackden and Bhanu (1999), Blackden et al. (2006), Morrison, Raju, and Sinha (2007), Nallari and 
Griffith (2009), and Momsen (2009). Some of the recent evidence is further discussed in subsequent sections. 
2Lazear (1983) provides one of the first systematic discussions of the concept of intergenerational 
externalities. A key point of his contribution was to draw attention to the negative externalities that may result 
when parents underinvest in themselves (both in terms of education and health) because they fail to consider 
spillover benefits to their children.  
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has focused on women's differential access to education, formal sector employment, assets, 
production technology, health care, and social institutions, as well as on how the relationship 
between gender and growth is mediated by women's labor force participation, productivity, 
and earnings. However, the transmission of health from mothers to children, coupled with the 
general issue of health persistence from childhood to adulthood (which is not gender specific), 
and the role of women's access (or lack thereof) to basic infrastructure services, has not been 
the subject of formal analysis. We integrate all of these issues in a three-period, gender-based 
overlapping generations (OLG) model of endogenous growth, and use the resulting 
framework to address the role of public policy. 
 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section II begins with a review of the 
evidence on the intergenerational transmission of health, and the persistence of health 
between childhood and adulthood. It continues with a review of the evidence on women’s 
time use, with particular emphasis on how inadequate access to infrastructure constrains time 
allocation and market work. Section III presents our analytical framework. The solution of the 
model, in terms of women’s occupational choices and long-run growth, is discussed in 
Section IV. A number of gender-related policy experiments (an increase in subsidies to child 
care, a reduction in the wage gap in the market place, and improved access to, and efficiency 
in the use of, public infrastructure), are discussed in Section V. The implications of our 
analysis for the role of women in the design of growth strategies in developing countries are 
discussed in Section VI. 
  
 
II. OVERVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE 
 
This section begins with a review of the evidence on the intergenerational (or vertical) 
transmission of health, and the persistence of health (or horizontal transmission) between 
childhood and adulthood. We pay particular attention to the transmission of HIV-AIDS from 
mothers to newborns, a widespread problem in Sub-Saharan Africa. It continues with a review 
of the evidence on women’s time use, with particular emphasis on how access to core 
infrastructure services (or lack thereof) constrains time allocated to market and nonmarket 
activities. 
 
1.  Intergenerational Health Externalities and Health Persistence 
 
1.1  Intergenerational Health Externalities 
 
There is much evidence that a mother’s health—which may itself depend on her level 
of education—affects directly the health of her children. In addition, to the extent that health 
in childhood affects health in adulthood, a mother’s health today may determine the health of 
future mothers and their earning ability. 
 
  1.1.1 Mothers' Health Status and Child Development 
 
It is now well documented that the children of inadequately nourished mothers are 
likely to suffer systematic negative effects—including low birth weight, stunted growth,  
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susceptibility to disease, and intellectual impairment. This may be due either to nutritional 
reasons (insufficient nutrition to the fetus) or physiological factors (the growth potential of a 
fetus may be constrained in a stunted woman). In turn, the potential damage to low-birth 
weight babies from being born undernourished is compounded when they remain 
undernourished during infancy and early childhood. A malnourished or anemic mother may 
be unable to produce the quality or the quantity of breast milk needed to help her low-birth 
weight baby; and without breast milk, an infant's immune system does not develop properly. 
It becomes prone to diseases such as malaria, respiratory tract infections, and pneumonia. 
Early weaning also puts a child at severe risk of infections and disease. In addition, to the 
extent that a malnourished mother has a low life expectancy, it may induce her to take her 
daughters out of school, because a shorter time horizon lowers the value of educational 
investments. This may lead to persistence in poor health for women, through the “education 
channel” discussed later. 
 
Evidence that a mother’s poor health actually affects the health of their children in 
utero, that is, even before they are born, includes Lim et al. (2002) and Field, Robles, and 
Torero (2007) . Lim et al. (2002) found that the nutritional status of Korean women in pre-
pregnancy (with respect notably to folate, a B vitamin essential for cell growth and 
reproduction, as well as iron, and calcium intakes) affects pregnancy outcomes. In a study of 
Tanzania, Field, Robles, and Torero (2007) found that children who benefited from iodine 
supplements in utero exhibited higher rates of grade progression at ages 10 to 14. 
Furthermore, the effects appear to be substantially larger for girls, consistent with the 
evidence indicating greater cognitive sensitivity of the female fetus to in utero iodine 
deprivation. Thus, a mother’s lack of iodine intake during pregnancy may also help to explain 
gender differences in schooling, as discussed later.  
 
A contrario evidence that low life expectancy for mothers may adversely affect their 
daughters’ health and education prospects is provided by Jayachandran and Lleras-Muney 
(2009), in a study of Sri Lanka between 1946 and 1953. They found that the increase in life 
expectancy of girls associated with a large drop in maternal mortality was accompanied (for 
every extra year of life expectancy) by an increase in female literacy of 0.7 percentage points 
and years of education by 0.11 years. Finally, there is also evidence that maternal mental 
health may have a sizable effect on child development, with maternal depression significantly 
increasing the odds that a child will experience growth faltering (that is, low height for age) 
and poorer education outcomes (see Das et al. (2009)).
3  
 
Another aspect of the mother-to-child transmission of health that has received much 
attention in recent years is related to the AIDS/HIV epidemic. As documented by the United 
Nations (2010), the number of women receiving treatment for prevention of mother-to-child 
transmission of HIV has increased threefold in recent years, from 15 percent in 2005 to 45 
percent in 2008. There have been some notable successes in prevention, most notably in 
Lesotho (see Box 1). However, in 2008 only 21 percent of pregnant women worldwide were 
receiving HIV testing and counseling, while only one third of those identified as HIV-positive 
during antenatal care were subsequently assessed for eligibility to receive antiretroviral 
                                                 
3However, these associations could also reflect genetic links between parents and children.  
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therapy for their own health. These problems are most pressing in Sub-Saharan Africa, where 
the prevalence of HIV is, by far, the highest. 
 
 
Box 1: Preventing Mother-to-Child Transmission of HIV: Lesotho’s Experience 
 
      With nearly a quarter of its adult population living with HIV, Lesotho has one of the 
highest HIV prevalence rates in the world. Average life expectancy is just over 40 years. In 
recent years the country has launched a major effort to reverse the spread of HIV and to make 
AIDS prevention, treatment and care accessible to all. 
      Through its country-wide Know your Status campaign and a renewed national policy and 
strategic plan on HIV and AIDS, Lesotho has made significant progress in getting more 
people tested for HIV. At the same time, more of those in need are getting access to anti-
retroviral (ARV) treatment. The most notable success, however, has been the country’s rapid 
expansion of prevention of mother-to-child transmission (PMTCT) of HIV services. 
      In 2007, a massive effort was initiated to improve the country's PMTCT services. Every 
clinic in the country became able to provide HIV testing and treatment. Nurses were allowed 
to administer ARV treatments, thereby greatly expanding access to these interventions in the 
remote areas of the country, where fewer doctors are available. In 2006, only 5 percent of 
HIV positive pregnant women received PMTCT services; today, the coverage stands at 42 
percent. Out of 207 health facilities around the country, 180 of them now provide PMTCT 
services. 
      However, initial efforts were met with a significant challenge—the fact that many women 
are likely to make only one visit to a health facility. Although ARV drugs can increase the 
chances that a baby is born free of the virus, providing HIV-positive mothers with the 
treatment is not easy, especially in remote areas. This is a typical problem for many health 
systems in Sub-Saharan Africa, and is caused by a variety of factors—cultural attitudes, 
distance, lack of transport (or poor infrastructure, as discussed elsewhere in the text) and 
poverty prevent many women from making regular antenatal care visits. Such factors also 
lead many women to drop out of the PMTCT programs, and to deliver their babies at home 
without the presence of trained medical professionals. 
     In response to these difficulties, new prevention methods were developed. The 
Government designed a minimum package for expectant mothers that includes the most 
effective ARV drugs and antibiotics needed to keep them, and their children, healthy. When 
they leave the clinic, these women are also provided with clear instructions on what 
medicines they need to take, and when, and what medicines they need to give to their babies 
after their birth.   More recently, a new color-coded take-home box was introduced; instead of 
the nurses having to pack the medicines all in small pill bags, this “mother to baby pack” 
clearly separates the ARV drugs and the antibiotics according to when they need to be taken. 
This new approach may further reduce the number of babies born with HIV. 
 
 
  1.1.2 Mothers' Educational Status and Child Development 
 
A mother’s level of education also affects her children’s health. A number of studies 
have found that mothers with higher levels of education have healthier children, even after 
controlling for variation in household resources, and that the education of mothers has a much  
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stronger effect on children's health than does the education of fathers.
4 Better-educated 
mothers know more about the benefits of proper diet and hygiene; they are also more likely to 
seek medical care, ensure that their children are immunized, be better informed about their 
children's nutritional requirements, and adopt improved sanitation practices. In addition, these 
women may have better access to information about health care, and to be better able to 
process and act on the information that they acquire. As a result, infants and children of 
women with some formal education have higher survival rates and tend to be healthier and 
better nourished. A mother with a few years of formal education is also more likely to send 
her children to school—which in turn may improve their health, by allowing them to learn 
better hygiene practices. 
 
The evidence for Sub-Saharan Africa for instance shows that children of mothers who 
receive five years of primary education are 40 percent more likely to live beyond age five, and 
educated mothers are about 50 percent more likely to immunize their children than 
uneducated mothers (see Morrison, Raju, and Sinha (2007)). McGuire (2006) found that the 
average number of schooling years for women has a statistically significant impact on the 
mortality rate of children under five. Kiros and Hogan (2001) for Ethiopia, Castro et al. 
(2006) for Guatemala, and Oloo (2005) for a larger group of developing countries, also found 
that female literacy tends to lower child mortality. Similarly, in a study of 47 Sub-Saharan 
African countries over the period 1999-2004, Anyanwu and Erhijakpor (2009) found that 
female literacy is significantly and negatively related to both infant and under-five mortality 
rates. A study that followed women for over 35 years in Guatemala showed that the benefits 
of mothers’ schooling for their children’s health are even greater than previously estimated 
from studies conducted at one point in time (Maluccio et al. (2009)). More generally, the 
educational attainment and cognitive development of children are positively affected by the 
educational attainment of parents, partly through improved health.
5 
 
There are a number of other ways through which maternal education benefits children, 
boys and girls alike. Better educated mothers may spend more time and resources on 
children's health and education ((Brown (2006)). Behrman et al. (1999), in a study of rural 
India, found that literate and better-educated mothers spend more time on children's school 
work. Educated women tend to have fewer children, which reduces dependency ratios and 
thus increases (all else equal) per capita consumption within households.  In their study of 
Brazil, Lam and Duryea (1999) found a strong negative effect of women's schooling on 
fertility. Brazilian women with zero years of schooling give birth to 6.5 live children; this 
number declines to 3 for women with 8 years of schooling. Further, they argue that the effect 
of schooling on fertility works primarily through increased investment (including time) in 
child quality. As discussed in more detail in Appendix A, educated mothers may also have 
greater bargaining power within the household over intra-family allocation of monetary 
resources, be better able to act on their preference for investing in children, and have a greater 
impact on family decisions regarding the allocation of children’s time to household chores 
                                                 
4See Hill and King (1995) and Glewwe (1999) for early surveys. See also Morrison, Raju, and Sinha 
(2007). 
5For evidence on the positive effect of parental schooling on children's schooling, see for instance Lam 
and Duryea (1999).  
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(meal preparation and cleanup, doing laundry, ironing, dusting, and indoor home cleaning and 
maintenance, etc.). 
 
However, some caution is needed in interpreting the link between mothers’ education 
and children’s health. First, it is not simply the completion of a certain number of years of 
schooling by mothers that may yield the benefits outlined earlier; rather, it is literacy that 
appears to drive the relationship between education and health outcomes. This means that 
school quality is what really determines the extent to which children may experience health 
benefits from their parents’ education (see Lloyd (2009)). Moreover, if access to 
infrastructure is poor, even well-educated mothers may be unable to act upon their health 
knowledge and take their children to health facilities—an all too common problem in Sub-
Saharan Africa (see Box 1). Second, there is evidence that better-educated women marry 
better-educated men; it is thus possible that the observed effect of women's education may 
also, to some extent, reflect unobserved preferences of their husbands for healthier or better-
educated children (see Schultz (2002) and Duflo (2005)). A study of rural India, for instance, 
found that in a setting where educated women do not participate in the labor market, better-
educated men are more likely to marry better-educated women (Behrman et al. (1999)).  
 
  1.2 Persistence from Childhood to Adulthood  
 
There has been much research in recent years on the effects of early childhood 
influences on later life outcomes; studies include Case, Fertig, and Paxson (2005), Schady and 
Paxson (2007), and Smith (2008).
6 In particular, it has been shown that events before five 
years old may have a very large long-term impact on adult outcomes: child and family 
characteristics measured at school entry do as much to explain future outcomes as factors that 
economists have more traditionally focused on, such as years of education. In a study based 
on data for Ecuador, Paxson and Schady (2007) for instance found that health measures such 
as height for age and weight for age are positively related to language development, a 
measure of cognitive ability. Perhaps more dramatically, Helmers and Patnam (2010) found, 
in a study of Andhra Pradesh, India, that child health at age one influences significantly 
cognitive abilities at age five.
7 
 
The persistent effect of health in childhood on health in adulthood appears to operate 
to a significant extent through its impact on educational attainment in childhood. Indeed, the 
available evidence suggests that protein-energy malnutrition during the early stages of a 
child's life can lead to permanent impairment of central nervous system functions. Folate and 
iodine deficiency in utero, as documented earlier, and iron deficiency during infancy, may 
also cause permanent neurological damage. An adult’s physical work capacity is thus 
determined by his entire nutritional history. Consequently, health represents a key inter- and 
intra-generational mechanism through which poverty is transmitted: people born into poorer 
families experience poorer childhood health, lower benefits from investments in human 
capital, and poorer health in early adulthood, all of which are associated with lower 
                                                 
6See Currie (2009) and Almond and Currie (2010) for an overview of the literature on the role of health 
in the intergenerational transmission of socioeconomic status—with a focus, however, on industrial countries. 
7They also find that child health at age one is influenced by parental care during pregnancy, consistent 
with our previous discussion.  
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productivity and earnings in middle age—when children themselves become parents. To the 
extent that health in childhood depend on the time that mothers allocate to their brood, health 
dependence gives a crucial role to mothers' time allocation in shaping the future of their 
children. 
 
2.  Women’s Labor Supply and Occupational Constraints 
 
2.1 Evidence on Women’s Participation Rates 
 
While participation of women in the labor force has increased in recent decades in 
almost all regions of the world, there are still significant gender gaps in participation rates, 
occupational levels and wages. As noted in the introduction, in today's low- and middle-
income countries the labor force participation rate for women (the percentage of the women 
population aged between 15 and 65 years who are in the labor force) is only 57 percent, 
compared to 85 percent for men. The share of women above the working age who are 
employed (the employment-to-population ratio) was about 50 percent in 2009 compared to a 
male employment-to-population ratio of about 74 percent (International Labour Office 
(2010)).  In the Middle East and North Africa adult labor force participation rates are below 
30 percent, and in South Asia below 35 percent (see Table 1).
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Moreover, paid employment for women has expanded slowly and women continue to 
assume the largest share of unpaid work. Close to two-thirds of all employed women in 
developing countries work as contributing family workers or as workers on their own account, 
typically in forms of employment that are highly vulnerable and lack job security and 
benefits. In that sense, the relatively high labor force participation rates for women in East 
Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa documented in Table 1 do not tell the full story. Indeed, 
women's share of waged non-agricultural employment has increased in the last decade but 
only marginally; the share of women in the agricultural labor force exceeds 45 percent in Sub-
Saharan Africa and South East Asia and the Pacific (Figure 1). In most regions female 
employment remains concentrated in either services or agriculture, with fewer women than 
men employed in industry (ranging from 7 to 23 percent, compared to 12 to 34 percent for 
men). The only region where men and women have similar patterns of employment by sector, 
both in relative composition and in trend, is East Asia and Pacific. There is also considerable 
variation in the gap between the proportions of males and females participating in the labor 








                                                 
8Studies based on data pertaining to both developed and developing countries suggest the existence of a 
U-shape relationship between labor force participation and the level of income per capita, with participation 
being the highest in the poorest and richest countries (see Mammen and Paxson (2000)). Box 4 discusses a 




Labor Force Participation Rates for Adults, World and Regions, 1999-2009 
 
*Preliminary. 
Source: ILO, Global Employment Trends, January 2010 (p. 50). 
 
There are a number of reasons that explain why women in developing countries, in 
general, have significantly lower labor force participation rates than men. They include social 
norms and religious beliefs, which often translate into women devoting more time to 
household production activities than men.
9 In what follows we focus on the role of constraints 
in access to infrastructure. 
 
 
                                                 
9See for instance Kevane and Wydick (2001) for the case of Burkina Faso and Ilahi and Grimard (2000) 
for an overview. There is also evidence that, despite reductions in gender gaps in the workplace and large 
increases in female labor participation rates, women in some industrial countries continue to spend nearly twice 
as much time on housework than their male counterparts. See for instance Schaffnit-Chatterjee (2009) for 
Germany. At the same time, as documented by Del Boca and Locatelli (2006), although mothers may continue to 
devote more time to childcare than fathers, the gender gap has fallen in several industrial countries and husbands' 




Percentage of Women in Total and Agricultural Labor Force 
      
Source: Mehra and Rojas (2008). 
 
Figure 2 
Male-Female Gaps in Labor Force Participation Rates 
Regional Minimum, Maximum, and Median, 2008 
(Percentage Points) 
 





2.2 Women’s Occupational Constraints 
 
Women in developing countries face a number of constraints on the allocation of their 
time between market and nonmarket activities. There are various factors, including cultural 
and social norms that may account for them; in many countries, cultural norms are that 
women are expected to continue to do most of the housework and childrearing—even if they 
engage in market work full time.
10 This tendency is often exacerbated by a lack of 
government programs to alleviate constraints associated with child care. 
 
In what follows we will focus on access (or lack thereof) to infrastructure. The role of 
infrastructure in promoting growth in developing countries has been the subject of renewed 
scrutiny in recent years (see Box 2).
11 While many of the “new” channels through which 
infrastructure may affect growth are not gender specific, some of them do affect 
disproportionately women and their ability to allocate their time. In what follows we provide a 
brief review of some of the empirical evidence on how constraints on access to transport 
infrastructure, water and sanitation, and electricity, affect women's time allocation. 
 
 
Box  2: New Channels through which Infrastructure Affects Growth  
 
      In addition to the conventional positive effects on factor productivity and private 
investment, and possible adverse effects through crowding out, recent research and evidence 
on the role of infrastructure in the growth process has highlighted a significant impact on 
health and education outcomes. 
      Indeed, a number of studies have found a direct positive impact of various types of infra-
structure services (namely, roads, electricity, water and sanitation, and telecommunications) 
on learning indicators, for boys and girls alike.  A better transportation system (particularly in 
rural areas) helps to raise school attendance. Similarly, greater access to safe water and 
sanitation in schools tends to raise attendance rates (especially for girls) and the ability of 
children to learn, by improving their health. Access to electricity helps also to improve the 
learning process, by allowing children to spend more time studying and by providing the 
opportunity to use electronic learning devices. 
       Infrastructure may have a sizable impact on health outcomes as well. Access to safe 
water and sanitation helps to reduce infection risks, particularly among children. Better 
transportation networks contribute to easier access to health care, especially in rural areas. 
Access to electricity, by reducing the cost of boiling water, helps to improve hygiene and 
health as well. Availability of electricity is essential for the functioning of health care 
facilities and the delivery of health services. Getting access to clean energy for cooking in 
people's homes (as opposed to smoky traditional fuels, such as wood, crop residues, dung, 
and charcoal) improves health outcomes by reducing indoor air pollution and the incidence of 
respiratory illnesses (such as asthma and tuberculosis), and low birth weight and infant 
mortality (see World Bank (2008)). According to some estimates, indoor air pollution from 
                                                 
10See for instance Thambiah (2009) for a discussion of the case of Malaysia. 
11Agénor (2010a, 2010b, 2010c, 2011) provides a more extensive review of these channels, which 
include, in addition to health and education (as discussed in Box 2), an effect on the durability of private capital, 
network externalities, and an impact on innovation. For a more “conventional” review of the role of 
infrastructure, and a general perspective on policy options for Sub-Saharan Africa, see Foster and Briceño-
Garmendia (2010).  
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the burning of solid fuels kills over 1.6 million people (predominantly women and children) a 
year.
12 More efficient electric (or solar-powered) stoves would reduce this death toll, which is 
almost as great at that caused by unsafe water and sanitation, and greater than that the one 




     
Lack of roads and other transport infrastructure constrains the ability of women to 
travel to perform activities related to household production and income-generating activities. 
They often end up traveling on foot, while at times carrying heavy loads. As documented by 
Riverson et al. (2006) for instance, in Ethiopia, 73 percent of women's trips and 61 percent of 
their travel time is dedicated to meeting their household's energy, water, and food needs. On 
average, women in rural Sub-Saharan Africa spend between .9 and 2.2 hours per day on 
transporting water and firewood (see Weiss (1999) and Blackden and Wodon (2006)); they 
travel on average between 1 and 5km per day on foot for 2.5 hours, while carrying a load of 
about 20kg (Riverson et al. (2006)).  
 
Women also depend on transportation for health care, for themselves and their 
children. In many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, a majority of women in rural areas rank 
distance and inadequate transportation as major obstacles in accessing health services 
(African Union (2005)).  Women may have to travel long distances sometimes to reach 
obstetric care, and may die or lose their babies as a result (see Mills et al. (2007)). As 
discussed in Box 1, lack of transportation is one of the reasons why women with HIV/AIDS 
in Lesotho fail to visit health facilities often enough to seek treatment. Thus, lack of access to 
transport infrastructure not only constrains time available for market-related activities but may 
also have direct adverse implications for women’s health—and thus their productivity and 
earning potential. 
 
2.2.2 Water and Sanitation 
     
Women in low-income countries allocate a considerable amount of time to collecting 
water for household production (see Isha (2007) for an overview). In Pakistan, women 
allocate an average of 27 hours per month—or approximately 15 percent of their monthly 
work time—to this activity (Ilahi and Grimard (2000)). In Madagascar and Benin, women 
spend 164 hours per year and 273 hours per year, respectively, collecting water; this 
corresponds to 14 and 23 hours a month, or 8.8 percent and 14.4 percent, respectively, of 
monthly working time (Blackden and Wodon (2006)). In Kenya, as documented by d’Adda et 
al. (2009), women devote 3.8 hours a week collecting water (compared to 1.3 for men), or 
equivalently 15.2 hours a month (compared to 5.2 hours a month for men). In Guinea, lack of 
access to water also imposes a very high time cost on women (Bardasi and Wodon (2009)). More 
                                                 
12For instance, in a study of rural Orissa, India, Duflo et al. (2009) found that over 72 percent of all 
households in India and 90 percent of households in the country’s poorer, rural areas use traditional solid fuels, 
such as crop residue, cow-dung, and firewood to meet their cooking needs; they also found a high correlation 
between using a traditional stove and having symptoms of respiratory illness, although the direction of causality 
is not easy to establish.  
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generally, the WHO estimates that 40 billion “woman-hours” are spent carrying water in 
Africa annually (see Temin and Levine (2009)).  
 
Lack of access to water and sanitation (combined with poor access to transportation 
services) may also have an adverse, indirect effect on education outcomes for girls—
especially in rural areas. Studies have indeed found that when sanitation facilities are lacking, 
dropout rates for girls tend to be higher. 
 
2.2.3 Electricity 
     
A number of studies have shown that lack of access to electricity acts as a significant 
constraint on women’s time, by forcing them to rely on fossil fuels and to devote less time to 
income-generating activities, rearing children and furthering their education, and accessing 
health care for themselves and their children. For instance, Ilahi (2001) found that women 
living in rural Peru who rely on firewood or coal as a source of energy tend to allocate a 
smaller proportion of their time to self-employment activities and a greater proportion of time 
to housework, compared to women who use gas or electricity. In Kenya, as documented by 
d’Adda et al. (2009), women devote 2.7 hours a week collecting firewood (compared to 0.3 for 
men), in addition to the almost 4 hours a week that they spend collecting water. 
 
Lack of access to electricity may also hamper the ability of women to take care of their 
own health and the health of their children, both directly and indirectly.
13 Infants’ and 
children’s health may be adversely affected because of greater exposure to indoor air 
pollution produced by the burning of fossil fuels (as discussed in Box 2), or greater exposure 
to bacteria and parasites due to lack of refrigeration of food and boiling of water. Lack of 
access to electricity may also affect child health outcomes by increasing the amount of time 
that women allocate to home production activities and reducing the amount of time that they 
can devote to raising their children and engaging in market work—which reduces (as noted 
earlier) the ability of mothers to generate income. 
 
  To the extent that it leads to more intensive use of wood charcoal, and thus to 
environmental degradation, lack of access to electricity may contribute to a larger work 
burden for children. In turn, children who spend more hours on resource collection work are 
less likely to go to school; this is particularly so for girls. This means that environmental 
degradation affects children’s school performance, but the impact on girls may be much more 
damaging. It has been argued that this may be one explanation for the increased gender gap in 
education in Malawi (Nankhuni and Findeis (2003)). 
 
3.  Analytical Implications 
 
The evidence reviewed in the previous subsections has important analytical 
implications for understanding and modeling the links between gender and growth. First, to 
                                                 
13Wang (2003) found that access to electricity had the greatest impact on decreasing infant mortality in 
poor countries compared to other significant variables, namely income, access to water and sanitation, 
vaccination in the first year of life, and the share of health expenditures to GDP. Similarly, access to electricity 
explained 64 percent of the variation in mortality among children under five.  
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the extent that children’s health depends on their mother’s health and the time that they 
allocate to child rearing, and that health in childhood is an important determinant of health in 
adulthood, women’s time allocation plays a crucial role in determining health outcomes, 
productivity and wages in adulthood, and the overall growth process. Second, when women 
lack access to core infrastructure services, they must allocate a greater proportion of their time 
to household chores. This is vividly illustrated in the aftermath of major shocks, such as 
earthquakes (see Box 3).
14 The opportunity costs of poor infrastructure for women include 
wage labor, acquiring an education, and investing in their own health and the health of their 
children. Thus, to a significant extent, the gender gap in employment and wages in adulthood 
may result from women’s lack of access to infrastructure. 
 
 
Box 3: Gender and Growth Effects of Natural Disasters  
 
       The loss of life and the material destruction caused by natural disasters is often 
staggering. The January 2010 earthquake in Haiti is a case in point. Understandably, the 
initial efforts focused on helping survivors cope with their immediate needs. But strikingly 
absent from some of the initial, longer-term reconstruction plans aimed at putting the country 
on the path to recovery was any discussion of what should specifically be done to support 
Haitian women in the months and years ahead. 
      When it comes to taking lives, earthquakes are gender-blind; but in poor countries their 
consequences, often, are not. In Haiti, there is little doubt that the earthquake has put women 
in a more precarious position compared to men. Research on women’s time allocation, 
infrastructure, and economic growth (as discussed in the text) suggests that there are two 
main reasons why this largely hidden cost may have potentially serious implications for the 
country’s longer-term economic recovery. 
      The first is that women in Haiti, as in many other developing countries, bear the brunt of 
household chores, such as collecting water and fuel; the destruction of most of the country’s 
(already weak) road infrastructure forced them to allocate even more of their time to these 
activities. In the immediate aftermath of the quake, some women in Port-au-Prince were 
spending up to 4 hours a day collecting water; although the situation will improve over time, 
progress will only occur gradually. Damages to roads have also forced women living in rural 
areas to devote more time to taking their goods to urban markets. As a result, they have been 
forced to spend less time taking care of themselves and their children—with potentially 
serious long-term effects on their children’s cognitive skills and brain development.  In turn, 
lower educational achievements and lower productivity in adulthood, will act as a severe 
constraint on economic growth. 
       The second reason is that although the reconstruction effort will create many badly 
needed jobs in construction and related activities, many of them, by their very nature, will go 
to men. Even though women (and their children) will benefit indirectly from male 
employment, the lack of job opportunities for them will weaken their earnings capacity; in 
turn, this may diminish their bargaining position in household decisions, with some possibly 
serious adverse effects (see Appendix A). In particular, empirical studies suggest that weaker 
female bargaining power renders women more vulnerable to intimate partner violence and 
often translates into less family resources being allocated to children’s health and education. 
Poor health and educational outcomes in childhood will also have longer-run implications for 
the quality of the labor force and the country’s growth prospects. 
                                                 
14Box 3 is based on an unpublished note by P.-R. Agénor and M. Agénor.  
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      Helping women is thus not simply a matter of social justice (a desirable goal in and of 
itself); it is essential to promoting sustained growth in Haiti. From this perspective, and as 
discussed in this paper, specific measures designed to help women (in areas such as 
employment, health care, and education) must be implemented early on, at the inception of 
the recovery program—rather than assuming or hoping that the benefits of the reconstruction 
effort will somehow “trickle down” to them. 
 
 
By implication, improved access to core infrastructure services may enable women to 
devote more time to market activity for instance, possibly reducing the gender gap and 
promoting growth. At the same time, it may lead to improved learning monitoring (in the case 
of electricity, for instance) as well as improved child care practices (including breast feeding), 
which may strengthen the health status of children and their ability to learn.
15 Greater access 
to safe water and sanitation in schools may also raise attendance rates for girls. However, it is 
possible that the increase in time that women devote to market work come at the expense of 
time allocated to child care; if so, and given health persistence, the longer-run effects on 
growth could be mitigated, or possibly reversed—despite the fact that higher earnings may 
allow mothers to spend more on goods and medical supplies for their children. The key issue 
to address therefore is how an improvement in the quality and quantity of infrastructure 
affects, both directly and indirectly, the time women allocate to these various activities and 
how, in turn, changes in women's time allocation affect economic growth. 
 
 
III. AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
While many studies have examined the relationship between gender, growth, and 
development, there have been few attempts to rigorously model the role of inter- and intra-
generational (or vertical and horizontal) health externalities, and the impact of access to 
infrastructure on women’s time allocation in this context. In this section we present a three-
period, gender-based overlapping generations (OLG) model of economic growth with public 
capital that captures both of these aspects.
16 
                                                 
15In developed countries, a number of studies have focused on how greater access to consumer durables 
(made possible by improved technologies and access to electricity) helped to “liberate” women from domestic 
production activities and led to dramatic increases in married female labor-force participation. Studies for the 
United States include Greenwood and Seshadri (2005), Greenwood et al. (2005), and Coen-Pirani et al. (2010); 
Cavalcanti and Tavares (2008) provide a cross-country analysis. Coen-Pirani et al., in particular, estimated the 
effect of household appliance ownership on the labor force participation rate of married women using micro-
level data from the 1960 and 1970 US Censuses. The results show that the diffusion of household appliances 
contributed significantly to the increase in married women’s labor force participation rates during the 1960s. It 
may also be an explanatory factor for the subsequent increase—today, 80 percent of college-educated women are 
in the labor force, compared to 62 percent in 1963; as of July 2010, women accounted for almost 47 percent of 
the work force and 51 percent of professional workers. However, the spread of contraception methods may have 
played an equally (if not more) important role in the latter expansion, by allowing women to postpone marriage 
and child bearing, and increasing their incentives to invest time in the acquisition of advanced skills.  
16The model both simplifies—by excluding human capital aspects—and integrates the models in 
Agénor (2009) and Agénor and Agénor (2009), while focusing on different issues. A brief summary of the 
literature on gender-based OLG models is provided in Box 4. None of the existing contributions, however,  
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In the model, women's time is endogenously allocated not only to market work, but 
also to home production and child rearing. In most of the literature, time allocated to home 
production is usually ignored, whereas rearing time is typically considered exogenous.  
However, in the present context endogenizing mothers' rearing time is important because such 
time is productive—it helps to enhance children’s health outcomes, as documented earlier. In 
addition, the model accounts not only for the productivity effects of public infrastructure (as 
in many other contributions) but also for its effects on the efficiency of mothers' time 
allocated to child rearing and home production. Through these channels, infrastructure may 
exert sizable indirect effects on long-run growth. 
 
 
Box 4: Gender-Based OLG Growth Models  
 
       Gender-based OLG models of economic growth are relatively few; among the notable 
exceptions are Galor and Weil (1996, 2000), Momota (2000), Zhang et al. (1999), Lagerlöf 
(2003), Andreassen (2004), Greenwood et al. (2005), de la Croix and Vander Donckt (2010), 
and Cavalcanti and Tavares (2010). 
        In an important contribution, Galor and Weil (1996) assume that in adulthood men can 
perform two types of labor, “physical” and “mental,” whereas women can offer only “mental” 
labor. These postulated differences in abilities translate into differences in wages earned. The 
decision-making unit in the model is the couple, which decides on fertility and savings (and 
thus capital in the next period). In turn, family decisions depend on the level of capital, 
because the level of capital per worker changes women's relative wages. The reason is the 
assumption that capital complements mental labor more than it complements physical labor. 
Increasing women’s wages decreases fertility by raising the (opportunity) cost of having 
children, and lower fertility raises the level of capital per worker. 
        For low levels of capital, female relative wages are low. Thus, women devote all their 
time to child rearing and bearing, and fertility remains constant. Once capital per worker is 
sufficiently high to induce women to join the labor force, there is a rapid decline in fertility. 
An extension of the model that introduces technology for having children produces an 
inverted U-shaped pattern of fertility, consistent with the evidence. Technology for having 
children improves with the level of income or capital per capita. Thus, at very low levels of 
income, couples have fewer children than they would like. As income increases, so does the 
number of children per couple. However, once capital per capita reaches a certain level, 
women join the labor force and fertility declines. Women's labor force participation rate 
presents a U-shaped pattern corresponding to this pattern of fertility (see Mammen and 
Paxson (2000)). At low levels of income, they work more than they would like. As income 
increases, female labor force participation decreases. Eventually, capital per capita is high 
enough to induce women to join the labor force again. An exogenous technical change 
explains why society may go from an equilibrium with low wages for women, high fertility, 
and low female participation in the labor market, to another equilibrium with higher wages 
for women, lower fertility, and greater female labor force participation. 
       Galor and Weil (1996) abstract from issues of child quality versus quantity and do not 
consider the relation between fertility, growth, and the gender gap in education; growth is 
exogenous and the basic unit of analysis is the couple; thus gender is treated only implicitly.  
By contrast, Zhang et al. (1999) provide a more explicit treatment in the context of an 
                                                                                                                                                          
accounts explicitly for the impact of public capital on growth, either directly, through production, or indirectly, 
through women's time allocation.  
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endogenous growth model. They extend the OLG model of Ehrlich and Lui (1991) to the 
choice of sons and daughters. In their model gender bias takes the form of parents directly 
choosing more boys than girls. A child’s human capital accumulation is based on the total 
human capital of both parents, and parents act as teachers to their children. Thus, in 
accumulating human capital in any generation, the cross-gender effects of mothers on sons, 
and fathers on daughters, tend to dissipate any initial gender gaps in human capital in a long-
run growth equilibrium; however, this may not occur in an economy with little human capital 
investments—implying that the gender gaps are “locked in” in a poverty trap for both men 
and women. However, they do not provide a full discuss of mothers’ allocation of time. 
       De la Croix and Vander Donckt (2010) introduce several dimensions of gender inequality 
(including gender heterogeneity in parental time requirements) into a gender-based OLG 
model that encompasses a non-unitary representation of household decision-making. They 
characterize a Malthusian corner regime (with high fertility and large gender disparities in 
education) in addition to the interior growth regime. The low growth Malthusian equilibrium 
is characterized by strong gender inequality in education and high fertility. They show that 
reducing the social and institutional gender gap in economies trapped in the Malthusian 
regime does not help to escape from it. Reducing the wage gender gap does not help either. 
The key policy measures which most likely will ease these countries out are to promote 
mother’s health and longevity and to curb infant mortality. However, their model remains 
incomplete, because it does not explain wage formation endogenously. 
       A contribution focusing more directly on the role of public expenditure is Cavalcanti and 
Tavares (2010). In their model, government spending affects households' choices with respect 
to fertility and female labor participation in the workforce because it helps to reduce the cost 
of child rearing and child care. If public spending reduces sufficiently the per child cost of 
raising children, it may induce mothers to engage further in the market work. However, they 
do not distinguish between the time allocated (per child) and the cost per child. 
 
 
Formally, we consider an OLG economy where two goods are produced, a marketed 
commodity and a home good, and individuals live for (at most) three periods (denoted t-1, t, 
t+1): childhood, adulthood (or middle age) and retirement. The marketed commodity can be 
either consumed in the period it is produced or stored to yield capital at the beginning of the 
following period. Each individual is either male or female, and is endowed with zero units of 
time in childhood and old age, and one unit of time in adulthood. Children are born with the 
same innate abilities and depend on their parents for consumption and any spending 
associated with health care. All individuals, males and females, work in middle age; the only 
source of income is therefore wages in the second period of life, which serve to finance family 
consumption in adulthood and old age. 
 
In adulthood, individuals match randomly into couples with someone of the opposite 
sex to form a family. All income is pooled, and couples therefore become joint decision 
makers.
17 For simplicity, once married, individuals do not divorce; couples retire together (if 
they survive to old age) and die together. Rearing children involves both parental time and 
spending on marketed commodities to feed them and keep them healthy (medicines, hospital 
visits, etc.). Male spouses allocate inelastically all their time to market work. Due to 
exogenous factors (e.g. social or cultural norms), mothers incur the whole time cost involved 
                                                 
17Gender implications of nonunitary models of family resource allocation are discussed in Appendix A.  
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in rearing children; however, the efficiency of that time depends on access to infrastructure. In 
addition, they also consider two other alternatives in allocating their time: market work and 
home production. 
 
The health status of children depends on their mothers’ health and the time that 
mothers allocate to rearing them. In addition, health outcomes exhibit serial dependence, in 
the sense that health status (and productivity) in adulthood depends on health outcomes in 
childhood. This dependence, which is consistent with a number of studies (as discussed in the 
previous section), gives a crucial role to mothers’ time allocation in determining the earning 
ability of their children in adulthood. We also introduce gender bias in the workplace, by 
assuming that due to “glass ceiling” effects women workers earn less than men. 
 
At the beginning of the first period of life and the end of the second, there is a non-
zero probability of dying. For simplicity, survival probabilities for men and women, in both 
childhood and adulthood, are taken to be the same.
18 In addition to individuals, the economy 
is populated by firms and an infinitely-lived government. Firms produce marketed 
commodities using public capital in infrastructure as an input, in addition to male and female 
labor and private capital. Home production (which affects positively utility) requires both 
women's time and infrastructure services. 
 
1.  Home Production 
 
Home production, which includes core household chores, involves combining 
women's time, in proportion 
f,P, and infrastructure services. For simplicity, we assume that 













I is the stock of public capital in infrastructure, K
P,T the aggregate stock of private 
capital, π
Q   (0,1), and ζ
 P ≥ 0 is a fixed efficiency parameter. Thus, greater access to roads or 
electricity allows mothers to devote less time to home production. Access to infrastructure is 
subject to congestion, measured by the stock of private capital, as discussed next. 
 
2.  Market Activity 
   
Firms are identical and their number is normalized to unity. They produce a single 
nonstorable commodity, using male labor, N





f is average (economy-wide) female labor productivity, private capital, K
P,i, 
and public infrastructure. Although public capital is nonexcludable, it is partially rival 
because of congestion effects; congestion is taken to be proportional to the aggregate private 
                                                 
18Our analysis therefore does not account for observed differences in life expectancy between men and 
women, which tend to be positive at low levels of income (due to high maternal mortality), and negative at 
higher levels. This issue is left for future research. 
19To economize on notations, the time subscript t is omitted when all variables in an equation are dated 




P,T. To capture the gender gap in the firm, we assume that in each firm men 
have privileged access to technology-intensive positions.
20 A productivity gap therefore 
emerges between men and women, leading employers to pay men relatively more.
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r = (1 - 2)Y
i/K
P,i,                                                         (4) 
 
where w
m is the male wage, w
f the effective female wage, and r the rental rate of private 
capital. 
 
  Given that all firms are identical, and that their number is normalized to 1, aggregate 














P.                                          (5)
 
 
  Thus, if the ratios in parentheses are constant (as happens to be the case in the steady 
state) the private capital-output ratio will also be constant; they would grow therefore at the 
same (long-run) rate. 
 
  Assuming full depreciation, private capital accumulation is driven by 
 
                                                 
20Large gaps in wages or hourly earnings between men and women, even after controlling for education 
and other forms of human capital are well documented, as mentioned in the introduction.  One explanation 
frequently given for these wage gaps is the occupational segregation of women into low-paying and precarious 
employment. Indeed, in a cross-country analysis of the factors contributing to the gender pay gap, Corley et al. 
(2005) found that women are more highly segregated in low-skilled occupations than are their male counterparts. 
Our assumption about technology captures this segregation in an implicit manner. 
21In Chichilninsky (2008), the gender gap is the result of a Nash equilibrium in a game with incomplete 
information about women’s work at home and in the marketplace. In her model, expectations about women’s 
lower wages lead to the overutilization of women in the household; this, in turn, leads to lower productivity and 
lower wages for women in the market place. Thus, inequity at home breeds inequity in the market place and, 
reciprocally, inequity in the market place leads to inequity at home. She also shows that although rational, this 
equilibrium is inefficient. 
22Based on the male and female labor participation rates shown in Table 1, one would expect these 
shares to be significantly different; Momota (2000), for instance, uses values of 0.5 and 0.2, respectively, in a 





P(t+1) = I(t).                                                                (6)
 
 
3.  Time Allocation and Utility 
 
At the beginning of adulthood in t, all men and women are randomly matched into 
married couples. Each couple has n children. A family raising a child faces two types of 
costs. First, mothers must spend ε
f,R   (0,1) units of time on each of them, because they take 
care of the child's health (going to the hospital for checkups and vaccination, etc.). Second, 
raising children involves costs in terms of marketed commodities. Specifically, it entails a 
fixed cost per child (regardless of gender) equal to a fraction 
R   (0,1) of the family's net 
income. This cost is related to taking care of their health needs, namely, buying medicines.
23 
Thus, there is both a direct (private) cost to access to health services, and an indirect cost, in 
terms of foregone wage income and foregone consumption. 
 
  As noted earlier, ε
f,P denotes the time women allocate to home production (which 
includes time spent collecting water and firewood, as discussed in the previous section). The 
time that mothers can devote to market activity is thus 
 
ε
f,W = 1 - ε
f,P - p
Cnε




C   (0,1) is the probability of survival from childhood to adulthood.
24 
 
  Families consume both the marketed commodity and the good produced at home. 
Assuming that consumption of children is subsumed in their parents' consumption, the 














t-1(t+1) are the family’s consumption in adulthood and old age, respectively, 
h
C health status of a child,  > 0 is the discount rate, and Q,N > 0 are preference parameters. 
Actual family size (or net fertility rate) is p
Cn(t), which differs from the gross fertility rate, 
n(t), because the child survival rate is less than unity. The term p
Cn(t)h
C(t) is thus the actual 
number of healthy children. For simplicity, in each family half of the children are daughters 
and half of them sons. This is a sensible assumption in a model where only monogamous 
relationships can occur. 
 
Children die, if at all, at the beginning of the period; parents therefore incur rearing 
costs only on their children who survive into adulthood.  The family's budget constraints for 
periods t and t+1 are given by
26 
                                                 
23As in Olivetti (2006), we could introduce a CES “child care production function,” which combines 
mothers’ time and market goods; this would allow us to analyze the implications of the degree of substitutability 
between these two inputs. It could be assumed also that the unit cost 
R is itself a function of a child’s health. 
24To avoid convergence of population size toward zero, it is assumed that p
Cn ≥ 1. 
25For simplicity, only the marketed commodity is consumed in old age. 
26In standard fashion, we assume that there is an actuarially fair annuity market that channels savings to 





t-1(t) + s(t) = [1 - 
Rp
Cn(t)](1 - )w




t-1(t+1) = [1 + r(t+1)]s(t)/p




A   (0,1) is the adult survival probability,    (0,1) a constant tax rate, s(t) savings, 
and w











f is female labor productivity. 
 





t-1(t+1)/[1 + r(t+1)] = [1 - 
Rp
Cn(t)](1 - )w
T(t),                           (11)
 
 
4.  Health and Productivity 
 
Health status in childhood, h
C, depends on the fraction of the family’s net income 
spent on each child, the effective amount of time allocated to child rearing by the child’s 
mother, on the mother’s health, and the provision of health services by the government, H
G, 










P,T)^(1-C)],                                     (12)
 
 
where    (0,1) measures the impact of a mother’s health on a child’s health, C   (0,1), and 











R   (0,1). Thus, greater access to infrastructure allows mothers to devote less “raw” 
time to child care, while providing the same effective time.
27 
 
We do not model explicitly the health status of males and their productivity, and 
assume instead that both are constant and normalized to unity.
28 By contrast, we assume that 
the health status of females in adulthood, h
f depends on their health status in childhood: 
 
h
f (t) = h
C(t-1).                                                         (14)
 
                                                                                                                                                          
share the savings plus interest left by savers who die at the end of their adult life. The gross rate of return to 
saving is thus [1+r(t+1)]/p
A, instead of 1+r(t+1), as shown in (9b). 
27The congestion factor in both (12) and (13) can be justified by assuming that taking advantage of 
government-provided health services, and accessing roads and other infrastructure services, are hampered by a 
more intensive use of these services by private sector firms, as measured by the aggregate private capital stock 
(see Agénor (2009)). The results would not be affected qualitatively if instead congestion was measured in terms 
of aggregate output. 
28Thus, h
C in equation (12) should be viewed as referring to the health of daughters.  
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This specification is consistent with the evidence reviewed earlier, which suggests that 
early childhood health affects cognitive and physical development, which in turn affects 
health outcomes later in life. 
 
Female productivity, a




f  = h
f.                                                                (15)
 
     
Thus, a mother’s health affects a child’s health, which in turn affects the health and 
productivity—and thus earning capacity—of the child in adulthood. A child’s health also 
affects eventually the health of their future children, and so on. As a result, there is serial 
dependence in health: the (average) health of a mother today depends on the (average) health 
of a mother yesterday. Crucial for the analysis is the magnitude of  in (12); in what follows 
we will consider separately the cases where  = 1 and  < 1. 
 
5.  Government  
 
  As noted earlier, the government taxes only the wage income of adults. It spends a 
total of G
I on infrastructure investment, G
H on health, and G
U on other (not directly 
productive) items. All its services are provided free of charge. It cannot issue bonds and must 
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f),     h = I, H, U                    (17)
 
 
where h   (0,1) for all h. Combining these equations therefore yields 
  
h = 1.                                                              (18)
 
 





I (t).                                                        (19)
 
 
  The production of health services by the government is taken to be linear in public 
spending on health services:
30 
 
                                                 
29For recent evidence on the positive link between health and productivity (as proxied by wages), see 
for instance Kedir (2009) for Ethiopia. He also finds evidence of nonlinearity, with the effect of health becoming 
stronger above a certain level. The analysis could be easily extended to account for decreasing marginal benefits 
of health. 
30As in Agénor (2008a, 2008b, 2009), and consistent with the evidence in Box 2, it could be assumed 





H.                                                             (20)
 
 
6.  Market-Clearing Condition and Population Growth 
 
  The asset-market clearing condition requires equality between savings and investment, 
or equivalently, that tomorrow's private capital stock be equal to today’s savings by adult 









fs(t).                                          (21)
 
 
The number of adults alive in period t is itself given by 
 
N(t) = p
Cn(t-1)N(t-1),                                                      (22)
 
 
that is, the number of children born in period t-1, n(t-1)N(t-1), who survived to period t. 
 
Thus, there are two concepts of gender inequality in the model: a time allocation gap 
to market work between adult men and women, measured by the ratio 1/ε
f,W; and a core 
wage gap in the market place, as measured by the parameter b. The first gap is endogenous 
and corresponds to the (market) participation gap in de la Croix and Vander Donckt (2010), 
for instance. However, because ε
f,W is determined residually in our setting, it also reflects 
gender bias in the allocation of time to home activities—household chores and child rearing. 
Both measures can be viewed as pertaining to the concept of “economic participation and 
opportunity” for women incorporated in the Global Gender Gap Indicator proposed by the 
World Economic Forum (2010).
31 Most importantly, in our analysis, the time allocation gap 
is influenced by access to infrastructure, which affects the efficiency of time allocated to 
home production and child rearing. 
 
 
IV. WOMEN’S TIME ALLOCATION AND GROWTH: EQUILIBRIUM 
 
An equilibrium of the economy requires the existence of a time sequence of prices, 
consumption in adulthood and in old age, physical capital stocks and female health status such 
that, given initial capital stocks K
P(0) and K
I(0) and initial health statuses h
C(0) and h
f(0), 
individuals maximize utility, firms maximize profits, markets clear, and the government 





f.  In addition, in a balanced growth equilibrium, consumption and capital (both 
public and private), and output grow at the constant, endogenous rate γ, the rate of return on 
private capital is constant, and health statuses of children and adult females are either constant 
                                                 
31In the Global Gender Gap report (2010), the size of the gender gap is measured based on four 
dimensions of inequality between men and women: economic participation and opportunity (including salaries, 
participation levels, and access to high-skilled employment); education attainment (including access to basic and 
higher-level education); political empowerment (including representation in decision-making structures); and 
health and survival (including life expectancy and sex ratio).  
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or grow at a constant rate. We now characterize the solution of the model, beginning with 
implications for women’s time allocation. 
 
1.  Women’s Wages and Occupational Choices 
 
  Consider first the implications of the analysis for the observed gender wage gap. In 
equilibrium, men and women are in equal numbers in the adult population (N
m = N
f); thus, 







f,W.                                                         (23)
 
 
  This condition implies that if men and women have equal productivity (A
f = 1) and 
devote all their time to work (ε
f,W = 1), then w
f = bw
m; the observed wage differential between 
men and women is therefore constant and due entirely to the fact that men hold positions that 
entail access to a more productive technology than women—a direct reflection of 
discrimination in the workplace. In general, however, relatively lower wages for women may 
also result from differences in relative productivity, 1/A
f, and the relative allocation of time, 
1/ε
f,W. Put differently, women may have lower wages than men also because they are not as 
healthy as men—which, as shown earlier, has an adverse effect on their productivity—or 
because they cannot devote as much time as they would like to market activity, as a result of 
social norms or inadequate access to infrastructure—the latter, as shown next, forcing them to 
allocate relatively more of their available time to child rearing and home production. 
 
As shown in Appendix B, solving the family's optimization problem leads to the 
following solutions for women's time allocation and the fertility rate: 




m, (1 + )
-1( - 
Pk
I)},                                         (24a)
 
     
ε
f,W = (1 - ε





RNC (1 - )(1 - C)
 -1]ε
f,W,                                        (24c)
 
 
n = (1 - C)/3
Rp





m is the minimum amount of time that women must allocate to household chores,  
= p
A/(1 + p
A + ) is the family's propensity to save, and 
 
 = 1/2, 
 
1 = Q
Q(1 - ) > 0,        2 = 1 + NC(1 - ) > 1, 
 
3 = 1 - C + [N (1 - )]
-1 > 0. 
 
Equations (24a) to (24c) imply that improved access to infrastructure services, up to a 
critical threshold k
I, reduces women's time allocated to home production and raises time  
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devoted to market work and child rearing. The decreasing relationship between k
I and ε
f,P 
implied by (24a), as long as ε
f,P ≥ ε
f,P
m, captures the main channel through which access to 
public infrastructure affects women's occupational choices.
32 Figure 3 illustrates the behavior 
over time of ε
f,P and ε
f,W as a function of k
I.
33 From (24a) and (24b), there is a critical value of 
the public-private capital ratio, k
I
1 =/
P, above which ε
f,P is equal to its minimal value and 
ε
f,W reaches its maximum value, 1/Λ₂. Thus, the more efficient infrastructure is (the higher 
P 




Access to Infrastructure and Women’s Time Allocation 
     
  
               Source: Adapted from Agénor and Agénor (2009). 
 
                                                 
32The term ε
f,P
m could be explicitly introduced in the model by rewriting the production function for 







Q. Note also that, had we chosen to model the 
impact of mothers’ rearing time and infrastructure services on health status in childhood as in equation (1), that 
is, by assuming perfect substitutability of these two inputs instead of the multiplicative form specified in (12), 
the solution of the model for ε
f,R would have entailed a relationship similar to (24a).
 
33The figure assumes that 1 > 1, to ensure that the initial value 
f,P(0), for k
I = 0, is higher than 
f,W(0). 
In turn, 1 > 1 requires Q > 1/
Q(1 - ), or that the home good be sufficiently valued by the family.  
34Another possible direct channel relates to the impact of infrastructure on unit costs of child rearing, 
R. 
As discussed in Agénor and Agénor (2009), if this cost tends to fall with greater access to infrastructure—
because better access to roads reduces the cost that mothers may incur to take their children to medical facilities, 
for instance—an improvement in such access will increase the fertility rate, n, and reduce women's time 
allocated to rearing each child, ε
f,R. However, this channel exerts no independent effect on time allocated to 
home production or market work, because d(p
Cnε
f,R)/d
R = 0.  
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The figure also shows the possibility of a home-bias equilibrium, where women 
allocate relatively more of their time to domestic activities (home production and child 




f,R  > ε
f,W, for 





M = [1 - NC(1 - )]/(1 + 2),                                        (25) 
 
which can be combined with (24a) to define a second threshold value, denoted k
I
2 in the 
figure. Beyond that point, greater access to infrastructure services reverses the bias in 
women's time allocation toward domestic tasks.
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From these solutions, it is also straightforward to show that an increase in the survival 
probability from adulthood to old age, p
A, increases the savings rate  and reduces the fertility 
rate n, as is standard in the literature.
36 In addition, for a given public-private capital ratio, it 
increases as well time allocated to market work, ε
f,W, and reduces the amount of time allocated 
to home production, ε
f,P. However, it has an ambiguous effect both on total time allocated to 
child rearing, p
Cnε
f,R, and time allocated to each (surviving) child, ε
f,R. Intuitively, the reason 
for this is that such time does not have a direct effect on the family's resources, neither today 
(there is no child labor) nor in the future (there are no intergenerational bequests). The net 
effect depends, in general, on the structure of preferences—namely, N and the parameter that 
measures the response of health status in childhood to mothers' time, C. In particular, as can 
be established from the results in Appendix B, the less mothers value their surviving children 
(that is, the lower N is), the more likely it is that time allocated to each surviving child will 
fall. Because ε
f,R affects the health status of women both in childhood and adulthood (as 
implied by (12) and (14)), this result is important to understand the general equilibrium effects 
of a change in the adult survival rate, as discussed in the next section. 
 
Finally, as can be inferred from (24d), an increase in the survival probability from 
childhood to adulthood, p
C, reduces pari passu the fertility rate and has no effect on women's 
time allocation. Thus, parents fully internalize an improvement in the survival rate of their 
offspring by reducing the number of children; total time allocated to child care, p
Cnε
f,R, 
therefore does not change.
 37 Note also that the equilibrium number of children does not 
depend directly on women’s time allocation; in particular, there is no direct, inverse 
relationship between fertility and time devoted by mothers to market work. 
 
2.  The Balanced Growth Path 
 
The balanced growth rate of the economy is derived in Appendix B. The public-
private capital ratio is shown to be given by 
 
                                                 
35Note that the condition for a home-bias equilibrium (25) does not depend on the discrimination 
parameter, b, that is, on the extent of gender bias in the workplace. This result is related to our assumption that 
husbands and wives pool their resources when taking family decisions. 
36See Agénor (2009) and the literature therein. 
37This, of course, is a strong property of the model. With a more general utility function, as for instance 




I = I/(1 - )(1 - 
Rp
Cn) = J,                                            (26)
 
    
which is constant, given that (24d) implies that 
Rp
Cn = (1 - C)/3. This expression also 
shows that an increase in the adult survival probability, p
A, lowers the public-private capital 
ratio, both by reducing the fertility rate, n, and by increasing the savings rate, .  
  
As shown in Appendix B, if κ < 1, the model is characterized by a zero steady-state 
growth rate in income per worker.
38 By contrast, when κ = 1 (so that a parent's health status 
has a permanent effect on a child's health), the system boils down to an autonomous first-
order linear difference equation in q = lnq, where q = h
f/(x
f)
2 is the ratio of women’s health 
status to the (squared) value of the private capital-female labor ratio, x
f: 
 
q(t+1) = lnq(t+1) = 8 + [1 – (1+C)]ln[q(t)],                                (27)
 
    
where 8 > 0 is a constant term defined in Appendix B. Because 1 - (1+C) < 1, there is a 
unique, nontrivial and globally stable steady state, q
SS.  As also shown in Appendix B, the 
balanced growth rate (in per capita terms) is given by 
 







Cn)[(1 - )(1 + b)]
-1(q
SS)
.                     (28)
 
    
Because q is constant in the steady state, female health status h
f grows at twice the rate 
of growth of the private capital-female labor ratio, x
f, which is also . This is also the rate of 
growth of public and private capital stocks.
39 
  
The equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 4. Curve QQ on the right-hand side panel 
represents the dynamics of qt, whereas curve GG on the left-hand side panel represents the 
dynamics of output growth per worker. The initial equilibrium obtains at Point A. 
 
 
V. GENDER-RELATED POLICY EXPERIMENTS 
 
To illustrate the role of public policy in the model, we consider three experiments: a 
reduction in the cost of child rearing, a reduction in wage gaps in the market place, and an 




m, which implies from (24a) that women’s time allocated to home production is 
sensitive to changes in access to infrastructure. 
 
                                                 
38Intuitively, if h
f is constant, so must be x
f, the private capital-female labor ratio, given the inter-
dependence between these two variables. This implies that the stock of private capital (and thus the level of 
output, given (5)) must grow at the same rate as the rate of growth of the adult population—and so does the stock 
of public capital, given that J is constant. If J, h
f, and x
f are all constant so must be output per worker. 
39The fact that female health status increases indefinitely may be difficult to understand intuitively if 
health is understood only as a physical concept; if so, one would expect health status to eventually converge to a 
fixed value (a perfectly healthy body). However, as noted in Agénor (2009), the possibility that adult health can 
grow without bound is easier to comprehend if “health” is more broadly understood as consisting of both 




Balanced Growth Path 
 
 
1.  Reducing the Cost of Child Rearing 
 
  Suppose that the government implements measures (free medical supplies, etc.) that 
lead to a drop in the unit cost of child rearing for the family, 
R.
40 We assume that these 
measures result from a reallocation among unproductive components of spending, GU, so that 
shares of all spending components remain constant. Thus, the shift in 
R is budget neutral and 
can be considered in isolation from other changes.
41 The results of this experiment are 
summarized in Figure 5. 
 
As can be inferred from (24d), a drop in 
R raises the gross fertility rate;
 however, the 
total cost of rearing surviving children, 
Rp
Cn, does not change. By implication, from (26), the 
public-private capital ratio J does not change either. In addition, as implied by (24a) and 
(24b), the amount of time spent by women in home production and in market work does not 
change. To ensure that the time constraint (7) holds, time allocated to rearing each (surviving) 
child, ε
f,R, must fall, to ensure that total rearing time, p
Cnε
f,R, remains constant; this is indeed 
what (24c) implies. There is therefore a substitution of “quantity” for “quality.” Although the 
reduction in 
R tends to promote growth (by raising savings) the fall in ε
f,R tends to hamper it, 
because it has an adverse effect on children’s health, which eventually affects their 
productivity in adulthood. Whether the latter effect dominates the former depends in 
                                                 
40d’Addio and d’Ercole (2005) discuss the role of a range of policies (including tax credits, cash 
benefits, leave provisions, and support for childcare costs) on the cost of child rearing and fertility in industrial 
countries. See also Apps and Rees (2005) and Del Boca and Locatelli (2006). 
41A more general analysis would involve accounting explicitly for public subsidies to child rearing by 
introducing them in the family and government budget constraints (see for instance Momota (2000)). Doing so 
would allow also an analysis of possible trade-offs between subsidies and productive components of public 
spending, which consist here of health or infrastructure.  
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particular on the magnitude of the parameter C, which measures the impact of rearing time 
on children’s health in (12). 
 
Graphically, curve QQ in the right-hand side panel of Figure 5 may shift either upward 
or downward, whereas curve GG in the left-hand side panel shifts inward (because of the fall 
in ε
f,R). The new equilibrium may be either at points (A', B') or (A'', B''), with lower growth in 
the first case and higher growth in the second. 
 
Figure 5 
Reduction in the Cost of Child Rearing 
 
 
2.  Reducing the Wage Gap in the Market Place 
 
  Suppose now that the government implements anti-discrimination laws that lead to a 
permanent reduction in wage bias against women in the work place; analytically, this can be 
captured by considering an increase in b.  
 
By (23), the direct effect of this policy (at the initial level of wages) is to raise family 
income. In turn, higher income leads to a higher level of private savings and private capital 
stock, as well as higher tax revenues. From (24a) to ((24d), women’s time allocation and the 
fertility rate are not affected. And because changes in b affect tax revenues and private 
savings in exactly the same way, by (26) the public-private capital ratio is not affected either. 
But higher tax revenues also lead to higher public spending on health, which has a positive 
effect on health in childhood and female health in adulthood, h
f. Because private savings and 
capital increase, the capital-female labor ratio x
f increases as well; thus q may either increase  
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or fall. Nevertheless, the direct output effect always dominates, so the reduction in gender bias 
leads to an increase in the steady-state growth rate.
42 
   
Figure 6 
Reduction in the Wage Gap in the Market Place 
 
 
Graphically, curve QQ in the right-hand side panel of Figure 6 may shift either upward 
or downward, depending on whether the “health effect” (through higher government 
spending) dominates the “savings effect” (through higher family income and savings). Curve 
GG in the left-hand side panel shifts upward. The new equilibrium is either at (A', B') or (A'', 
B''), both characterized by higher growth. 
 
3.  Improved Access to Infrastructure 
 
   Finally, consider the case of a public policy aimed at promoting access to 
infrastructure by women, by investing in rural roads, power grids, etc. This can be captured by 
considering an increase in I.
43 We focus on the case where the increase in investment in 
infrastructure is financed by a cut in unproductive spending (dI + dU = 0); thus, we do not 
                                                 
42Note that our analysis does not capture the possibility that gender gaps in access to managerial 
positions and employment may distort the allocation of talent and the production and productivity of human 
capital, as for instance in Esteve-Volart (2004).  In the present setting, this could be captured by extending the 
model to introduce (in line with the evidence provided by Corley et al. (2005)) a negative link between the 
female labor force participation rate and the gender gap, that is, between ε
f,W and b
-1. Had we accounted for 
these effects, the benefits of an increase in b on economic growth would be magnified. 
43In our simplified setting, we do not distinguish explicitly between infrastructure-related spending that 
is “time-saving” specifically for women, and other types of infrastructure. Some of the latter type of spending 
may not lead to an increase in the “public” capital stock per se, but rather to a buildup of private assets (for 
instance, solar-powered cookers). Accounting for these assets and their implications for time allocation and 
growth could be a useful extension of our framework.  
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address the potential trade-off that arises if financing occurs through a cut in the other 
component of (productive) spending, namely, health outlays (dI + dH = 0). We consider two 
scenarios: the case where all other variables remain constant (the “basic” transmission 
mechanism), and the case where improvements in women’s health are large enough to 
translate into a discrete change in survival rates. 
 
3.1 The Basic Transmission Mechanism 
 
From (26), the direct effect of the shock is of course an increase in the public-private 




m, we have 
 
ε
f,P = (1 + )
-1( - 
PJ).                                                  (29)
 
 
Thus, an increase in the share of government spending on infrastructure also lowers 
time allocated to home production, as discussed earlier. From (24b) and (24c), the drop in ε
f,P 
raises time allocated to market work, whereas time spent on child rearing may either increase 
or fall; in the former case, this leads to better children’s health and, later in life, improved 
health in adulthood.
44 Because survival rates are constant for the moment, the change in time 
allocation has no direct effect on the fertility rate, as implied by (24d). In addition, the 
increase in the public-private capital ratio raises the efficiency of time that mothers allocate to 
child rearing, 
R. Thus, if rearing time per child does increase, all of these effects also help to 
promote growth per worker and health outcomes. 
 
The results of this experiment are illustrated in Figure 7. Because the increase in the 
level of income also raises private savings and private capital, and because the fertility rate is 
not affected, the private capital-female labor ratio unambiguously increases. At the same time, 
female health in adulthood also improves—partly as a result of more rearing time (assuming 
indeed that it does increase) but also because of higher government spending on health (due to 
higher revenues induced by the increase in time allocated to market work). Because both x
f 
and h
f increase, the ratio q may either increase or fall. The outcome depends now on whether 
the combined “health and efficiency effect” (through higher government spending and 
improved efficiency of rearing time) dominates the “savings effect” (through higher family 
income). Curve GG in the left-hand side panel always shifts upward, whereas curve QQ is 
shown as shifting upward, reflecting indeed the case where the combined health-efficiency 
effect dominates. The new equilibrium is at points (A', B'), characterized by a higher capital-







                                                 
44An increase in child rearing time is consistent with the results of Koolwal and Van de Walle (2010) on 




Budget-Neutral Increase in Spending on Infrastructure 
with Constant Adult Survival Rate 
 
 
  3.2 Escaping a Mothers’ Health-Based Trap 
 
As indicated in the foregoing discussion, female health in adulthood h
f unambiguously 
improves following a shift in spending on infrastructure, as long as rearing time per child 
increases. Suppose first that, once women’s health crosses a certain threshold, h, the infant 
mortality rate p
C falls in a discrete fashion. In a way, this captures an intergenerational 
transmission of health, but in a different manner: a healthier mother, for instance, may 
breastfeed her child for a longer period of time, thereby reducing the risk of dying early in 
life. Formally, this can be captured by assuming that 
 
                                                                      p
C
m if h
f  h; 
p
C =                                                                              (30)
 
                                                                      p
C
M if h
f > h; 





m. The foregoing analysis corresponds therefore to the case where, although 
female health improves, it does not cross the threshold h. 
 
  Suppose now that the increase in I leads, at some point during the transition to the 
steady state, to an improvement in female health that is such that h
f > h and thus child survival 




M.  In addition to the effects highlighted in the previous discussion, 
there are two additional effects to consider.  First, as implied by (24d),the (gross) fertility rate 
falls pari passu with the reduction in child mortality. Second, from (24c), there is no change 
in rearing time per child, and thus no change in time allocated to home production or market 
work. Thus (as can be seen directly in (28)), the increase in the child survival rate has no  
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effect on steady-state growth per worker, fundamentally because in the present framework it 
leaves p
Cn unchanged. However, the welfare effects could be substantial, given that children’s 
health matters for the family. In addition, with intergenerational bequests (from children to 
parents, for instance), the growth effects could be significant. 
 
  Suppose now that the threshold effect of female health operates with respect to the 
adult survival rate, p
A; thus, instead of (30), we have 
 






A =                                                                              (31)
 











Again, there are now several additional effects to consider. As noted in the previous 
section, an increase in the survival rate leads to a higher savings rate, , and a fall in the 
(gross) fertility rate; both effects contribute to raising the steady-state growth rate per worker. 
At the same time, however, a higher savings rate raises the stock of private capital, which 
tends (through congestion effects) to lower the public-private capital ratio J, as implied by 
(26).
45 There is therefore an offsetting effect on J now, in contrast to the case where p
A 
remains constant. Nevertheless, we will assume in what follows that the net effect of an 
increase in p
A through these two channels is still to raise the growth rate. 
 
More importantly, the model may now display multiple development regimes, as 
illustrated in Figure 8.  Suppose that the economy is initially (t = 0) at point A. This 
corresponds to a value of h
f(0) and q(0) = h
f(0)/x
f(0). The figure also shows two threshold 
values of q, q
1 and q
2, corresponding to two values of the threshold h: h
f,1 and h
 f,2. Suppose 
first that the threshold in health is first located at h
 f,2, with a corresponding value of q
2, that is, 
to the right of point A'. As shown earlier, Point A' corresponds to the steady state of the 
system when the adult survival rate remains constant throughout. Following the increase in I, 
the adjustment process is thus similar to the one depicted in Figure 7; the ratio q converges to 
A', and the growth rate increases from B to B'.  
 
Suppose instead that the threshold in health is located at h
 f,1 < h
 f,2 with a 
corresponding value of q
1, that is, to the left of point A'. When the rise in p
A occurs, and the 
female health threshold is crossed, both QQ and GG shift upward a second time, and the new 
adjustment path takes the economy now from A to A'' and from B to B''. The jump in q results 
solely from the jump in female health when the threshold h
 f,1 is reached, because x
f does not 
jump. Thus, the effect of the shift in spending on infrastructure is magnified by the positive 




                                                 
45This effect would occur even if infrastructure exerted no externality effects on the efficiency of time 
allocated to child rearing (π




Budget-Neutral Increase in Spending on Infrastructure 





VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR GROWTH STRATEGIES 
 
Our review of the empirical evidence on inter- and intra-generational health 
externalities and infrastructure-related constraints on women’s time, together with our formal 
analysis and policy experiments, suggest several lessons for promoting the role of women in 
the growth process. These implications can be summarized as follows. 
 
1. Intergenerational transmission of health between mothers and children, and the 
persistence of health in the course of an individual’s lifetime (or, equivalently, vertical and 
horizontal health transmission), are essential concepts to understand the link between gender 
and growth. They may also be important to understand other issues as well, such as child 
labor and unemployment in early adult life—as well as persistence in income inequality. For 
instance, if parents internalize the fact that a child’s poor heath may limit his or her ability to 
acquire an education and support them financially in their old age (an important consideration 
in countries where pension regimes do not exist), they may choose to take them out of school 
at an early age—forcing them, in effect, to enter the labor market with limited or inadequate 
skills. Alternatively, if health can be improved through additional care, parents may be willing 
to invest more time in rearing their children, because this increases their potential earnings in 
adulthood and the amount of resources that they can allocate to support their parents. 
 
2. The empirical evidence on women’s time allocation shows clearly that women bear 
the brunt of domestic tasks—processing food crops, providing water and firewood, and caring  
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for children, the elderly, and the sick.  While social, religious and institutional factors are 
important, economic and structural constraints—especially lack of access to core 
infrastructure services in rural areas—play a significant role as well in explaining these 
patterns. Growth-promoting supply-side policies may not yield desirable effects, 
independently of other constraints (such as gender bias in credit markets), if women are 
unable to reallocate their time to new activities because of poor access to infrastructure.  
 
3. To reduce the share of time that women devote to domestic tasks, and to promote 
their participation in the labor force, it is important to alleviate infrastructure-related 
constraints and provide time-burden-reducing public goods.  From that perspective, providing 
better access to roads may be as important as improving access to local community facilities 
(e.g. wells, nurseries, sanitation provision, etc.). 
 
4. Giving greater priority in development programs to access to water supply and 
sanitation (e.g., standpipes in poor countries), energy for household needs, access to 
appropriate means of transport, can all contribute to improving women’s health as well; and to 
the extent that improved health lead to higher life expectancy and a reduction in the rate of 
time preference, it may promote investment in education, which in turn may increase wages 
and savings and induce a reallocation of family resources toward children—all of which 
contributing to higher growth. 
 
5.  Although policies aimed at promoting an increase in access to infrastructure have 
important benefits for women (in addition to other positive effects on growth), our formal 
analysis suggested that the reallocation of mothers’ time toward market work may be 
detrimental to the health of their children if it leads to a drop in time devoted to child care—
with persistent effects in their adult life.
46 Thus, macroeconomic policies may need to be 
complemented by microeconomic measures aimed, in particular, at making it easier for 
mothers to provide adequate care to their children.
47 A possible route to explore is to consider 
using instruments that create pecuniary incentives for mothers to increase the quantity and 
quality of time devoted to child rearing. For instance, refining further conditional cash transfer 
programs (CCTs) such as Oportunidades or Bolsa Familia in Latin America could provide 
incentives, conditional on health outcomes, without necessarily inducing mothers to divert 
time too hastily toward market activity. An additional well-designed and targeted payment for 
such services, while controlling for the quality of health outcomes for children among 
beneficiaries, could be worth exploring. 
 
6.  A more systematic effort to build gender-based macroeconomic and growth models 
is an essential step to better link macro level changes and micro level responses. Such models 
(possibly along the lines of the OLG framework outlined in this paper, extended to account 
                                                 
46Floro (1995) was one of the first to draw attention to the possibility that women’s time reallocated to 
market work may be detrimental to children, and possibly to economic growth. 
47Moreover, the fact that time allocated by mothers to child rearing is productive as a result of health 
persistence means that one should be cautious in using concepts such as “time poverty” (see Blackden and 
Wodon (2006)).  For instance, if we were to introduce intergenerational transfers in our formal analysis, it could 
well be that allocating more time to child rearing today is an optimal strategy for a family because it raises the 
earning ability of children when they become adults—and thereby future transfers to parents in old age.  
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for human capital, labor market distortions, intergenerational bequests, etc.) would 
complement existing micro tools (such as gender-disaggregated expenditure incidence 
analysis) and help to quantify the gender and growth effects of public policies in general, and 
gender-based interventions in particular. As an input in these models, there is also a need to 




                                                 
48For instance, using U.S. data, Kimmel and Connelly (2006) estimate a structural time use model (a 
simultaneous four-equation system) in which the dependent variables are the number of minutes in a mother's 
diary day that she devotes to home production, leisure, market work, and care giving. They are therefore able to 
estimate explicit wage and child care price elasticities for these variables.  With the exception of Koolwal and 




Other Channels through which Mothers Affect Child Health 
 
  There are several indirect channels, other than those discussed in the text (namely, 
intergenerational health externalities, which are related to mothers’ health and education), 
through which mothers can affect the health of their children, especially daughters. In this 
Appendix we elaborate on two of them: the impact of mothers on a) the intra-family 
allocation of monetary resources toward children and their needs; and b) family decisions 
regarding the allocation of children’s time to household chores. 
Regarding the first issue, there is evidence suggesting that when women have greater 
control over a household's resources, they are more likely to spend more (compared to men in 
a similar position) on necessities and on the development of her children.
 49 Thus, although 
working mothers may breastfeed less and have less time for child care, it is possible that this 
harm can be offset by the health benefits (in terms of greater access to medicines) that her 
earnings bring. Indeed, to the extent that policies aimed at encouraging female employment 
also reduce inequality in household income distribution and increase the share of household 
resources controlled by women, they will also be beneficial for the health of children. Put 
differently, the distribution of income within a household also affects children’s health; 
additional household income in the hands of women is more likely to benefit children (boys 
and girls alike) directly, possibly leading to improvements in their health status. As a result, 
increases in women's influence over decision-making in the household may lead to an 
intergenerational transmission of earnings capability. 
For instance, in a study on Bangladesh, Indonesia, Ethiopia, and South Africa, 
Quisumbing and Maluccio (1999) found that assets controlled by women have a positive and 
significant effect on expenditure allocations toward the next generation, such as education and 
children's clothing.
50 In the same vein, Joshi (2003) found that in rural Bangladesh certain 
types of female-headed households (those headed by married women in which husbands were 
not physically present) devote more resources to children, after controlling for a number of 
household and individual characteristics. Other studies reviewed in Morrison et al. (2007) also 
concludes that increases in maternal control over household resource allocation (which is 
typically associated with increased education levels of households) lead to improvements in 
child educational attainment and health. This, in turn, leads to increases in children's cognitive 
ability and productivity as adults (see specifically Hoddinott et al. (2005) and Behrman and 
Alderman (2006)). These studies therefore corroborate the view that there are causal links 
between women's control over resources and subsequent household decisions about resource 
allocation. This, in turn, may affect aggregate savings and growth. The fact that women may 
have greater concerns with improving the health of their children (or, more generally, human 
                                                 
49See de la Croix and Vander Donckt (2008) for an endogenous treatment of bargaining power in a 
gender-based model of endogenous growth. In their model, bargaining power depends essentially on relative 
human capital between spouses. 
50The evidence comes from studies seeking to test the so-called unitary model of household decision 
making, which assumes that all members in the household have the same preferences for allocating resources. 
These papers test the underlying assumption of “income pooling,” that is, the fact that husbands and wives pool 
their resources and that the marginal impact of additional resources coming into the household is independent of 
the identity of the person who owns it; see Park (2007) for a review of the recent evidence.  
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development outcomes in the household) may thus induce them to have a higher marginal 
propensity to consume out of their income than men.
51 
However, improvements in education and income do not necessarily lead to an 
improved allocation of family resources toward girls, specifically. In countries like China, 
India, and Korea, for instance, the preference for boys is equally strong in low- and high-
income families.
52 Because women in richer families tend also to have lower fertility rates, 
the pressure to produce a son and heir is very strong if the first child is an (unlooked-for) 
daughter.
53 In addition, the preference for sons may actually reduce spending and lead instead 
to higher savings. According to Wei and Zhang (2009) for instance, a comparison of savings 
rates for households with sons versus those with daughters reveals that in China the former 
type saves more than the second. The reason, in their view, is the fact that families with a 
single son must increase the chances of him attracting a wife. They argue that this 
“competitive saving” motive (due to intensified competition in the marriage market) may 
account for about half of the actual increase in the household savings rate during 1990-2007 
(see also Du and Wei (2010)). The implication of course is lower spending on children—
including girls. 
Consider now the second channel, that is, the possibility that mothers may affect their 
children’s health through the intra-family allocation of children’s time. There is evidence 
suggesting that intra-family allocations regarding children’s school and work time tend to be 
adjusted in the face of disease among family members. Indeed, household coping behavior in 
the presence of illness and death may involve not only changes in the family’s asset holdings, 
and cash or in-kind transfers to and from relatives (the coping mechanisms that have received 
the most attention in empirical research), but also investments in children’s schooling and 
labor substitution. The latter has proved to be an important strategy to compensate for the 
lower productivity of HIV-infected household members, for instance. As discussed by 
Corrigan, Glomm, and Mendez (2005), when parents become ill, children may be pulled out 
of school to care for them, take on other responsibilities in the household, or work to support 
their siblings.  Moreover, the intra-household reallocation of time often depends on the gender 
of household members: girls (who bear the brunt of domestic work to begin with) are more 
likely to be pulled out of school in response to adverse shocks.
54 
Indirect evidence suggesting that the reallocation of family time may indeed be 
important in response to adverse health and income shocks is provided by Hamoudi and 
Birdsall (2004), Arndt (2006), and Kalemli-Ozcan (2006), who all found that AIDS lowered 
                                                 
51At the same time, if women have a stronger preference than men for mitigating the effects of negative 
income shocks on the family, their marginal propensity to save may be higher. See Floro and Seguino (2002) and 
Stotsky (2006) for a further discussion. 
52Quisumbing and Maluccio (1999) provide formal evidence that parents do not have identical 
preferences towards sons and daughters, within or across countries. See Purewal (2010) for a broader discussion, 
with particular reference to India. 
53See Das Gupta et al. (2002) and the special report in The Economist, March 6
th, 2010, on gendercide. 
Part of the problem is the fact that it has become easier to select the sex of children. 
54Evidence of discrimination in the household between boys and girls is provided for instance by Amin 
and Chandrasekhar (2009), in a study of Bangladesh. They found that time spent studying outside school is 
strongly influenced by household decisions that favor boys, who appear to have about 30 minutes more 
discretionary study time than girls. Thus, schooling does not necessarily promote gender equality; gender 
differences in study time may persist even as school enrollment gaps diminish.  
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school enrollment rates in Sub-Saharan Africa.
55 More specific evidence on how households 
adjust the intra-family allocations regarding school and work time of children in the face of 
disease within the family includes Corrigan, Glomm, and Mendez (2005), and D’Adda et al. 
(2009) for Kenya. The latter study for instance found that changes in intra-household 
allocations of time devoted to non-market labor activities (primarily household tasks such as 
cooking and washing, and water and firewood collection, which are often carried out by 
mothers and their daughters) is an important coping strategy when the individual afflicted by 
illness is a working-age adult.  
 
                                                 
55These results are also consistent with the view that the mere risk that children may be infected by 
AIDS may deter parents from investing in their education, as argued by Bell, Devarajan, and Gerbasch (2006). 
Put differently, an environment where there is great uncertainty about child survival may exacerbate a 
precautionary demand motive for children, with less education being provided to each of them—a standard 
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